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Paper No. 2
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ROMAN CATHOLI C CHURCH
I N CROATIA , YUGOSLAVIA I N THE 1 970 ' S AND 1 980 ' S .

by Jure Kristo
J1..rre Kristo is native of Croatia, Yugoslavia . He came
to the United State s in 1 972 and attended the University
of :Notre Dame where he obtained his doctorate in 1 97 9 .
The focus o f his graduate work was the phenomenology o f
regigious experience . H e has taught at various univer
sities here and has le ctured abroad . He i s presently
associated with the I nstitute of Pastoral Studie s at
Loyola University in Chicago . Dr. Kristo has contributed
several articles to prominent journals here and abroad .
His most recent publication is "The Interpretation of
Religious Experience : i'lhat Do Hystics Intend when they
Talk about their Experience s? " in the Journal of Religion.
The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the communist re 
gime in Yugoslavia is almost as bad now as in the immediate postwar period
( 1 945 - 1 95 3 ) .

The C ommunist Party began its relentles s , organized attack on

the Catholic Church in 1 971 through the media and othe:- channels ;
slaught peaked in 1 981 .

this on

Unreasonable , escalated anti-religious propaganda ,

and imprisonment of a number of priests took place .

The attack on the Roman

Catholic Church i n the 80 ' s is being led by the same people , together with
their followers , who led the attack in the 40 ' s .

Jakov BlaZevic, who was

the state prosecutor during the infamous trial of · Cardinal Alousius Stepinac
(pronounced Stepinatz ) in 1 946 , renewed his bitter criticism of the "Stepinac
1
church " in Croatia in the beginning of 1 981 .
Ever since , there is rarely a
day in which an article in the neHsp apers or a spe cial on the radio or tele
vision is not addressed to the criticism of the Roman C atholic Church nnd ±ts
role among Croatians .

This may be an indication of the political situation

in Croatia and , more broadly, in Yugoslavi a, whi ch further complicates the
analysis .
The relationship betHeen the church and state i n Yugoslavi a, particularly
1-rhen it is a question of the Roman C atholic Churc h , i s as complex as the
political structure of Yugoslavia.
try to be as clear as possible .

Consequently , one must proceed carefully and

First , a short historical survey of the sit

uati on of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia -vrill be given .

Then an analysis

of the present status of the relationship between church and state will be
attempted .

Finally , a feif propositi ons about the possible improvement of the
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relationship between the Catholic Church and the c ommunist regime in Yugoslavia
will follow.

l.

Catholic Church in Yugoslavia--A Painful History
This is

C omprehend ing something necessarily implies knowing i ts history .

A c l oser

also true about C roatian people and the Catholic Church in its midst .

( called

l o ok at a map of Yugoslavia reveals that it is composed of s ix states
re publ ics

)

and two autonomous regions .

ive nations .

Rel igiously ,

East , comprising Serbia ,

The states c ompri s e ,

roughly , respect

Yugoslavia can be divided into two sphere s .

Maced onia and M ontenegro ,

The

is predominantly Orthodox

with substantial minorities of Albanian Moslems in Kosovo-Metohi ja and C roatian
Catholics and other minorit ies in V o jvod ina .
Bosnia and Hercegovina , and S l ovenia ,

The West , c omprising Croatia ,

is Roman Cathol i c with substantial Ortho

dox and Moslem minorities in Croatia and in Bosnia and Hercegovina .

Unti l

1919 , the Catholic West together with V o jvodina were part o f the Austro-Hungar
ian empire .

In 1919 ,

the C roatians and S l ovenians decided to join the kingdoms

of Serbia and Montenegro in order to f orm the kingdom of Sl ovenians , Croatians ,
and Serbians ,

later renamed Yugoslavia .

From the beginning , a c lash occurred

between two opposing views concerning the structure of the state .

On one hand ,

the Serbians showed hegemonistic tendencies by envisaging all the other nations
as an avenue for c reating the so-call ed Great Serbia .

On the other hand , Croa

tians advocated a federal ism that would give every nation a relative autonomy
and equal treatment .

Tension between Serbia and Croatia marked the political

l ife in Yugoslavia between 1919 and 1941 .
This political tension was reflected in the religious sphere as well .

The

Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church was e stablished immediately and com
prised many metropol itanates throughout the new state .
the new state and d iplomatic relations were established .

The Vatican recognized
The Vatican al s o tried

to regulate its relationship with the state by a c oncordate .

This c oncordate

was signed in 1935 , but the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed it vehemently .

To

many Cathol ics in the country it seemed that the Serbian Orthod ox Church wanted
to continue having the privi lege of the state rel igion which it enjoyed i n the
kingdom before unification with other nations .

The other nations in the state

felt they were in a subordinate positi on to the Serbians and the Serbian Orthod ox
Church .

The C roatians in p articular resented this situation .
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The atrocities committed by certain e lements in both nations , during
World War II were a direct c onsequence of the tens i on created by their unequal
status .

With generous help from the Allies , the C ommunist Party , led by Josip

Broz Tito , c ome to power in 1945 in what was called the New Yugoslavia .
The Catholic populati on was generally afraid of " godless communism"
before it had any firsthand experience of it .

The C ommunist Party of Yugoslavj a

made sure that the peopl e ' s fears were justified .

Almost immed iately after

taking power , The C ommunist Party organized numerous trials .

S tella Alexander

best describes these trials when she says that they were " swift , ruthless , with
few l egal trimmings , and identifying precisely the objects of the authoritie s '
2
The archbishop o f Zagreb , Al oysius Stepinac , was immediately
vengeance . "
arrested .

There was an attempt to c onvince the Catholic hierarchy to secede

from the Vatican and create a national Catholic Church modeled after national
Orthodox churches . When the proposal was flatly refused and when Archbishop
Ste pinac raised his voice against the unfounded imprisonments and senseless
kill ings of bishops , priests , and the faithful , the Party decided to stage the
trial of Archbishop Stepinac himself .
J
hard labor.

He was sentenced to sixteen years at

From then on , the history of the relationship between the Catholic Church
and the state in Yugoslavia was marked by ups and d owns .

It is important to

bear in mind that the improvement and worsening of this relaionship did not
depend exclus ively on the w i l l ingness or lack of it of either the Catholic
hierarchy or the C ommunist Party but l ikewise on the internal restructuring of
the Party and on gl obal internati onal relations .
The decade of the 50 ' s was for the Cathol ic Church a decade of c ontinued
repression and persecuti on .

The C ommunist Party itself was going through some

kind of " identity crisis" , s ince it was ousted in 1948 from the c ommunist al
l iance l ed by the Soviet Union .

In 1952 , Archbishop Stepinac , under house

rest , was e levated to ca!U inal , which angered the Communist Party

( newly

ar

renamed

the League of C ommunist of Yugoslavia--hereafter LCY ) to the point of breaking
dipl omatic relati ons with the Vatican .
In the sixties , there was an improvement in the relations between the
Catholic Church and the government in Yugoslavia .

In 1960 Cardinal Stepinac

died ; the l ead ership of the LCY then changed its tactics and sought to reestablish
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d i pl omatic relations with the Vatican d irectly .

In 1966 , this effort was re

warded by the signing of a d ocument , Protokol , clarifying the idiosyncratic
relationship between the church and state in Yugoslavia .

This d ispleased

the Croatian Catholic hierarchy because it felt that the Vatican and Yugoslav
pol iticians bypassed them c ompletely in bringing about a deci s i on vital to the ir
church and their nation

•

.

In the c ourse of this same year, 1966 , Aleksandar

Rankovic,vice president and head of the infamous . security police ( UDBA ) was
purged from the Party and numerous repressive practices were revealed and
admitted .
won .

It appeared that the ant i -central ist , federalist forces had f inally

Roman Cathol ics became hopeful that a new and better period had f i nally

arrived for them , too.
The next decade , howeve r , would demonstrate that their hopes were in vain .
In 1971 , the entire leadership of the League of C ommunists of Croatia was forced
to resign under accusations of liberal ism and exclusivism .
sharp turn toward centralism in the Party .

There was again a

The Catholic Church was accused

of supporting Croatian nat ionalism and of overt opposition to the policies of
the CLY .

These accusations have been repeated in one form or another for over

a decade , and the harangue is sti l l going on .
This sketch of the re lati onship between Cathol ic Church and s tate in Yugo
slavia was a necessary prol ogue to understandine the status of that ·relationship
today .

2.

The Catholic Church i n Yugoslavia at Present
Although the objectives of the League of C ommunists of Croatia and League

of Communists of Yugoslavia are not clear when they attack the Catholic Church
among C roatians in Yugoslavia ,
heavy fire .

it is a fact that the church c ontinues to be under

S ome motives ma�ecome clearer if we bear in mind the c oncrete socio

pol itical factors present in the region and on a global level .

For the last few

years , the Cathol ic Church has been headed by a Slavic Polish Pope , who knows
firsthand how the c ommw1ist machinery works and who would not l e t himself be
manipulated by well -pol ished propaganda .

On the c ontrary , the Polish Pope i s

very firm i n pressing the question o f s oc ia l justice and respect o f human rights .
Moreover, the Pope speaks Croatian , s ides with the hierarchy o f the Cath o l ic
Church in Yugoslavia , and uses every opportunity to encourage the justified
struggle of the Croati an nation ,

For the first time in decades the Vatican
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acknow l edges that the Croatian nati on has been frequently wronged and is resolved
to res i st the heavy propaganda on the part of the Yugoslav government.
In 1980 ,

Pres ident-for-life Tito d ied .

The c ommunist government that he

left s eems to be too afraid of the challenges that history has laid upon i t .
The economy was i n d isarray w i th a n over-twenty bi l l i on d ol lars debt t o the West
and excessive unemployment .

The government was aware t�t a d e c i s ive crisi s c ould

occur at any moment to threaten the very existence of Yugoslavia , because vari ous
segments of the populati on--particularly the Croatians and Albanians--were d i s 
satisfied .

Thi s was a l s o the year o f the beginning o f the Poli s h crisis , caused

by the resoluteness of a frustrated working class ,
tral interest of the C ommuni st Party .

who theoretically is the cen

It also became apparent that the Cathol ic

Church i n Poland was the most res�ected authority in the country .
The Yugoslav government feared the repetiti on of the Poli sh experiment in
Yugoslavia .

One way of preventing thi s cri s i s ,

it dec ided ,

was t o attack the

Cathol ic Church and oresent it to the people as the most reactionary e l ement of
the society , as a c l ericalist institut i on that harbors and protects fascists ,
and so on .

The term " Stepinac church" has been invented to suggest that the

Cathol ic Church in Yugoslavia espouses an ideo l ogy c ontrary to the interests
of the C roatian nati o n .
The year 1981 was no more favorable t o the League, ·
slavia than the previ ous yea r .

o f C ommunists in Yugo

Already in 1980 , a group o f Croatian intell i 

gentsia, among them two prominent Catholic priests , submitted to the central
Yugoslav government a request for amnesty for all political prisoners in Yugo�
slavia and the e l iminati on from the criminal statute of the paragraph appl ying
to ool i tical offenders .

The government res ponded early in 1981 by putting on

trial some of the most nrominent Croatian inte llectuals such as Dr . Franjo
Tud jman , former Army general and a l if e l ong member of the Communi s t Party ,
Marko Veselica ,

Dr .

professor of economics and former d e puty from Zagreb in the fed

eral Parl i a111ent, Vlado Gotovac , the poet and philosopher, Dobroslav Paraga, the
student lea d e r , and others .
By the end of �larch ,
crises .

Yugoslavia experienced one of its most d ifficult

The rioting in the autonomous region of Kosovo had to be suppressed

by the m il itary and oolice .

In add i t i on to all of thi s ,

particularly the West European ,

increased

the Western �ress ,

its criticism of the Yugoslav govern-
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ment .

It had revealed that the Yugoslav government has �en directly in

volved,

through its secret police , with terrori st activity ,

including the

assassinations of i ts own citizens living i n we stern countrie s .
With thi s historical background ,

it i s safe t o assume that the attack

on the Catholic Church has served two purp o se s .

O n one hand ,

the C hurch

i s chose n as the scapegoat for the e conomi c and political failure of the
system .

On the other hand ,

the insi ste nce of the C a tholic Church on human

rights has been considered to have a destabilizing effect o n the c ountry ,
which also means on the auth<Jri tarian grip of the Communis t Party .
The position of the Cathcli c hierarchy has been unequivocal .

Its views

have most often been prese nted throu7,h the homilies and pastoral letters of
Z agreb ' s Archbi shop Franjo Kuharlc,
of Yugoslavia .

I n his

1980

the Fresident of the Epi scopal Conference

Christman homily , Archbishop Kuhari� clearly stated

that the Church must prote ct everythi ng that is human and encourage others to
respect human rights including the right to practice re ligi o n without fear
and interference . 4

Kuhari� also mentioned the right of the impri soned to be

respe cted as hQ�an individuals and not to be exposed to tvrture , i nhuman
conditions ,

or solitary confinement in heatle ss cement cubicle s .

The govern

ment immediately i nterpreted the archbishop as taking Croatian political pris
oners under his wing .

Archbishop Kuhari6 reasserted this position during the

customary visit of all religious repre sentatives to the president of the Croa
tian Parliament ( Saber) ,

Jure Bilic',

at the beginning of the new year .

He said

then that the common good is being fulfilled "when the personal , national , and
religious identity of e very person i s guaranteed, whe n his or her unalienable
personal dignity i s protected , when e veryone ' s freedo• of conscience i s se cured
so

that he or she may live a private and public life in accordance with his or

her conviction, when the education of his or her children is entrusted to his
or her own conscience wi thout interference , whe n the condi tions pertaini ng to
work ,

living conditions ,

being are secured • ..5
Howeve r ,

and spiri tual growth which are appropriate to the human

soon after these events ,

the Catholic Church began.
of this e s say ,

a torrent of orchestrated attacks upo n

I t was initiated , a s we indicated a t the beginning

by the President of the Presidency of Croatia , Jakov BlaZe vic ,

the state prosecutor during the Stepinac trial in

1946 .

He was irri tated by the

continuous publi c veneratio n of the late cardinal ' s grave and the Church ' s pro-
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Bl aZevic vehemently

motion o f the cause o f Cardinal Stepinac ' s beatification.

attacked the church he put on trial and indicated that the present church deserve d the same fate .

6

In the same spee ch , BlaZevic reproached some of the e lements in his p arty
for be lieving that "the first premi se o f socialism" ought to be respect of
religious liberti es .

He called i t a contradi cti o n i n adjecto .

Thi s i s indic""

tive of the disposition of certain members of the Communist Party in Croatia
and Yugoslavia.

Apparen�ly , there are at least two factions in the Party it

self regarding religio n .
religion

( the

humankind .

One e spouses the conservative ,

"opium of people "

)

stalinistic ideas of

whi ch must be eradi cated from the midst of

The other faction is more open to contemporary studies and atti

tude s toward religion and views religion as an important part in the life o f
be li e vers and,
In any case ,

thus , a s a possible positive e lement for a socialist society.

the suppre ssion of religion by administrative me asure s i s consid

ered by thi s group as not only outmoded but very detrimentai for society.
This group includes professors and other intellectuals who call themselve s
sociologists or philo sophers of religion.

It is significant that a number

of professional Party politici ans e spouses the se same ideas on religion.
They are mostly younger Party members who come in conflict with the older , war
period generati o n .
vative ,

combative ,

I t i s safe t o assert, however ,

that a t present the conser

ce ntralistic part of the Party has gained the upper hand

and sets the concrete policie s .

Thi s i t true at least i n Croati a .

A s f ar a s the C atholic Church i n Yugoslavia i s concerned , i t i s not
without i ts i nternal divi sions .

The line of division separates the hierarchy ,

which has achie ved a surpri sing degree of consensus regarding the que stion o f
the relationship betwe e n church and state ,

on one hand ,

gians gathered around the C atholic publishing house ,

f?

}

hri stian actuality ,

and a group of theolo

"Kr�6anska sada�njost "

and i n the the ological association of the same name .

The reasons for their disagreements are somewhat obscure .
was i:rri tated by the very idea of a theological association .

The hierarchy

This i s under

standable when one remembers that the idea of an association of prie sts has
a very bad history in the context of Yugoslavia.
very outset ,

e ncouraged pri est associati ons ,

The government, from the

granting to their members a

privileged status i n comp ari son to the non-associated priests and ordinary
faithful .

The hierarchy ,

for its p art , i nterpreted these priest-associations as

a subtle attempt on the government ' s part at creating divisions withi n the
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Catholic Church and at exempting a body of the clergy members from hierarchical
supervision.

When, therefore , a group of theologians (made up almost exclusively

of priests) decided to form an association , it reawakened in bishops a sense of
danger.

As a result, many bishops demanded thE:: dismantling of the association ,

and some (like Franic, the diocese of Split) forbade the members of the as

sociation , to do a:ny pastoral work in their dioce se s .

Theologians., , for their

part, complain, albeit privately , that bishops have an antiquated idea of the
Church and that they

are

generally too conservative .

Their conservatism, some

theologians believe , has damaging ramifications on the political scene as well .
These theologians , most of them more immediately engw;ed in the work of
"Kr�canska sada�njost " , believe that bishops should publically endorse the

so

called self-goverPing socialism of Yugoslavia and invite the faithful to do the
same .

The Croatian people as a whole and the Catholic Church in particular, they

contend , would benefit from this change of attitude on the part of the hierarchy .
Some bishops also have problems with the Franci scans .
the case in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
parishes .

This is particularly

The bone of contention is the control of

Ever since the Turks captured these lands , the FranCiscans were , for

all practical purposes , the only nastors in this region.

Recently , however ,

some bishops (Hostar and Sarajevo diocese s ) have had an increase in priestly
vocations without having enough· parishes in which to place their priests .
sought

a

They

solutj_on of this problem by taking awa:y a number of parishes from

the Franciscans .
the Franciscan.

This ctcew a swift, sometimes even violent , reaction from both
fathers and their faithful.

begun to approach a settlement.

Only recently have these problems

Some are quick to note that this is a direct

result of the Blessed Virgin ' s invitation to peace during her alleged appa.ri tions
to some young girls and boys in the. summe r of 1981 in Medjugorje , Hercego.vina.
Although the se divisions.

are

hurting the Church enormously and are definitely

perceived by the faithful as scandalous, the attention of the Catholic Church
in Yugoslavia as a whole is presently focused in the relationship betwee n the
Chruch and the communist goverr�ent.

To the e scalating attacks on the Church,

which were mentioned earlier, the hierarchy responded once again through Franjo
Kuharic, the Archbishop of Z agreb.
of Cardinal Stepinac .

The occasion was the anniversary of the death

'l'he Z agreb Cathedral and the square in front held about

ten thousand who sensed that something decisive was about to happen.
homily was that event .

Kuhari� ' s

After expressing his hopes that, at some time in the
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future , an impa.riaJ. judgment would be passed on the role of' the Catholic
Church and its most famous representative Cardinal Stepinac during the war ,
the archbishop refuted one by one the standard government accusations of the
lat� Cardinal and the Catholic Church.

He pointed out that the documentation

and the final speech of' Cardinal Stepinac ' s defense lawyers has never been
published in Yugoslavia, whereas the allegations of' the prosecutor have been
repeated over and over as proof' of' the Cardinal ' s criminal activity .
This speech did not gladden the Party policymakers .
publisher of the Catholic biweekly ,

They forbade the

Glas Koncila, to publish Kuhari d ' s

spe e ch .

The hierarchy , howe:ver , seemed to be fully behind the Archbishop of

Zagreb.

After their conference at Z agreb in the end of April 1981 , they pub

lished a communique defending themselves against the customary accusation of
meddling in politics .

They also reasserted their responsibility to express

moral judgment when human rights are in que stion, and to protect their faith
fUl from agressive government-sponsored atheism .

They concluded by pointing out

areas of civic life in which religious and human li beri ties are impaired. 7
Theologians, for their part, mostly do not s� much.

They seem to avoid

quarre l s with the official segment of the Le ague of Communists .

Instead,

they engage in inte llectual diaJ.ogue with the i'larxist sociologists of religion
8
which, for the most part, is innocuous and fairly ineffective .
Often the
writings of the se scholars give the impression that they know their argumentations

are useless be cause thay cannot shape the concrete policies .

Theologians af

filiated with Jtr�canska sada�njost believe that the progressive elements in the
l€��e of Communists will eventually prevail and that they would then have a
partner in dialogue .

But they have to deal wi th the fact that such hopes have

been too frequently unfulfilled.
A few words should be said about the e cumenical movement in Yugoslavia.
'I'he truth is that there is not much more than a few words to say.
nations in Yugoslavia must first learn to live with each other.

The various
The historical

ballast is too heavy to be easily disposed of; deep-seated mistrust is still
too strong to allow the respective nations to come closer to each other.
is particularly the case with the Croatian and Serbian natio ns .

This

Unlike anywhere

e lse , e cumenism in Yugoslavia i s politically col0red and _p olitically sensitive-.
There is still the feeling among Croatians that the Orthodox population in
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Croatia i s used qy the Serbian hegemonists , represented

by

the Serbian Orthodox

Church, to realize the unfilfilled dream of Gre at Serbia and conversely Serbians
fear that e cumenism is a new attempt to turn them into "uniate .. churches .
E cumenism could perhaps make faster progress i f the Orthodox of Croatia estab
lish their mm autocephalous Orthodox Church .

Ca tholie Church

and

It. i s a fact , after all , that the

the Hacedonian Orthodox Church axe engaged in a vigorous

and fruitful dialogue , whi ch is not the case be tween the C atholic Church and the
S erbian Orthodox Chur.ch .

Nonetheless , e cumenism is

by

no means dead in Yugoslavia .

For the most part , however, it is limited t o the conversations be tween the
theologians of various churche s .

Periodical get-togethers of the repre sentative s

of Catholic and Orthodox theology faculties have becone

a tradition.

In the

opinion of many C atholic s , the Serbian Orthodox Church would like to engage in
serious dialogue with the Catholic Church if the latter was kneeling .

Conversely

many Ortholox fee l that the Catholic Church has the same aspirations in regard
to the Serbian Orthodox C hurch .

J.

A FeH Personal Pronositions
'Thi s e ssa;y has centered on the re lationship be tween the C atholic Church

and the communist government in Yugoslavia.

In the final secti on of this 1::o::i e f

essa;y , I would lilr..e to suggest some ideas that might help clarify certain issues
regarding the relationship between church

and

state .

The first point that appe ars to be crucial is that the church as a re ligious

and,

organiz ation is not political in nature

consequently , that it cannot have

a;rry political goals in the daily exercise of its mission.
in spite

( as

This must be said

of , and in face of the hi storical experience that Christian churches

1fell as other organized religions

)

have engaged in political activity .

This

admission must be made in a spirit of confe ssion and as a corrective to the

future involvement of the church in the world .
To assert that the Christi an church must not be a political organiz ation
doe s not me an , hm·rever , that it doe:::;

not have political relevance .

The

Yugoslav government , like other communist regime s , has attempted to make religious
organizations "sacristy organizations . ..

It should not be forgotten that religion

:: s a vi sion of life concerned uith humanity ' s well-being and happines s .
by the vision of human life brought about
gj on should

by

Inspired

Je sus of Naz areth , the Christian rel:i

oppose anything that diminishes the personal dignity of men and women

and support everything that adva.rJ.ces hu.lJlan welfare .

In our time , this concern
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for individuaJ. well-being has been expressed in terms o f human rights, a con
cern 'Hhich the church perceives

as

a reflection of its very being .

The LCY

should be aware of this nevr self-understc..nding of the chur.ch, reaJ.izing that
it canno t be disposed of by repressive means .

Here importantly 0 the LCY should

be avra.re that the church ' s concern for all that is human cannot hinder but can
only assist the gover.n.,�tent 1 s efforts for improving the eccnomic , sociaJ., and
poll ticaJ. well-being of its citizens .

The LCY should expect as well as accept

the possitility that the organized church will , follo1dl1b the dictates of its
Oi'1"Tl

mission among men and women, be criticaJ. of some governmental policies and

practice s .

The government can use this critical posture outside its

own

as a welcome catalyst for the oft acknouled.ged need fer self- criticism.

ranks
This

process m� be the be st substitute for a multi-party system--absolutely for
bidden in Yugoslavia--rdthout any threat to the political dominance of the
C oiiUllunist Party.
The church , for its part, should change some of its ways in regard to the
government .

It should be come ml'are that it does not have absolute solutions

for a:nythil1b and that its criticaJ. posture tonard the socio-poli ticaJ. concrete
ness must at the same tL'Tle be an equally critical posture tonard itself,
particularly tolrard its reli�:P-osi ty.

C onsequently 9 the church should take to

heart the government ' s criticism and use it judiciously as a catalyst for the
rather in..
-f':requently aclmonledged need for self-criticism .
The uniting point be tween the Catholic Church arui the League of Communists
of Croatia must be the nell-being of the Croatian people .

The source of most,

if not of all difficultie s in the area of relationship betl·reen the Church and
Party in Croatia is tl:e abandonment by both of promoting what is in the be st
interests of the people .

In short, both the Party and the Church have been

more involved vdth ideological battles than with the well-being of Croatian
nen and women living in the Yugoslav territory .
From the standpoint of the Croatian nation, both the Church and the Party
have falled it.

If both of these antagonistically positioned factors once

realize the truth of their failure toward the people , rerhap s this enlighten
ment might mark for then the begiw..ing of a qualitatively different relationship .
I suspect that the underlying element of many verbal fusillades between the
Catholic Church and the League of C omnunists of Croatia is the implied mutual
accusation of be trayal of the Croatian people .
are right.

The paradox is that both of them

Hhat is required now is an open admi ssion of "guilt " by both, a
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rededication and collaboration tm·rarcl the common goal of promoting the intere sts
of the Croatian people .
efforts

The historical moment is critical ; thus , the joining of

by the League of Conmumists and the Catholic Church i s nnich more crucial

than ever before .
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